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Direct Participation in Hostilities 
and Respect for the Lives of Civilians 
During Armed Conflicts
Introduction
One of the distinctive characteristics of the contemporary armed conflicts is 
the proximity of civilians to military operations and their considerable participa­
tion in hostilities. Throughout history, civilians have always contributed to the war 
efforts of the fighting parties, whether through their involvement in arms pro­
duction, by providing soldiers with food, equipment, shelter or by implementing 
political objectives closely associated with the military goals. Typically, however, 
civilians were not present on the battlefield and only a small number of them were 
actually involved in the conduct of military operations. 
In the second half of the 20th century (and in particular in the last decade) and 
in the first decade of the 21sl century situation radically changed -
a continuous shift of the conduct of hostilities into civilian population centres has led 
to an increased intermingling of civilians with armed actors and has facilitated their 
involvement in activities more closely related to military operations. Even more re­
cently, the increased outsourcing of traditionally military functions has inserted nu­
merous private contractors, civilian intelligence personnel, and other civilian govern­
ment employees into the reality of modern armed conflict. 2
Moreover, in contemporary conflicts states primarily fight wars against non- 
-state armed groups
456 Marcin Marcinko
to stand a chance against states with superior militaries, these groups often violate 
international humanitarian law, and more specifically the principle of distinction, by 
refusing to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. Due to the asymme­
try of power, blending in with non-combatants is often a critical part of the non-state 
armed groups’ strategy in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, and Somalia? 
As a result, civilians are more likely to fall victim to erroneous or arbitrary 
targeting, while armed forces - unable to properly identify their adversary - run 
an increased risk of being attacked by persons they cannot distinguish from the 
civilian population. *4
’ T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians are created equal. The principle of distinction, the question
of direct participation in hostilities and evolving restraints on the use of force in warfare’, Mili­
tary Law Review, Vol. 211 (2012), p. 115.
4 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 12.
5 See: P. Grzebyk, ‘Pojęcia osoba cywilna oraz bezpośredni udział w działaniach zbrojnych 
(wytyczne Międzynarodowego Komitetu Czerwonego Krzyża, Państwo i Prawo, No. 2 (2012), 
p. 60.
6 Ibid., p. 61. Indeed, “uniform guidelines establishing when and how individuals lose im­
munity in war are necessary to provide militaries clear targeting guidelines while safeguarding 
protections for non-combatants”. T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians...’, pp. 115-116.
7 See: art. 51 (3) of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977,
Under such circumstances it is necessary to determine who deserves to be 
treated as civilian and when such person may become a legitimate target under the 
law. One of the key elements of the international humanitarian law (hereinafter: 
IHL) which regulates the conduct of armed conflicts is the principle of distinction 
between civilians and members of the armed forces/combatants as well as between 
the civil and military objects/sites (accordingly, the law obliges the parties to an 
armed conflict to observe this principle). As a consequence, only combatants and 
military objects may be directly attacked in hostilities. 5 The above mentioned par­
ticipation of civilians in various military operations makes it compulsory to pro­
vide criteria for distinction between civilians who directly participate in hostilities 
and the so-called peaceful civilians. It must be clearly emphasized that according 
to IHL civilians who “take direct part in hostilities” are not protected against at­
tacks and when involved in any such activities may become a legitimate target of 
attack. In other words, such persons may fall victim and be killed despite the fact 
that they are civilians. It is therefore of utmost importance to provide a definition 
of direct participation in hostilities. Will, for instance, acting as human shield, 
driving vehicles carrying war weapons, operating field computer, providing re­
connaissance services or shelter to the armies of the enemy be considered direct 
participation in hostilities for that purpose? 6
However, neither Additional Protocols of 1977 to Geneva Conventions, Relat­
ing to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts7 (nor art. 3 common to Ge­
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neva Conventions) provide a clear definition of “direct participation in hostilities” 
and leave room for doubt and speculations which, in turn, resulted in interpreta­
tive abuses to the detriment of IHL principles. Therefore, bearing in mind serious 
consequences which arise from classifying a civilian as taking direct part in hostili­
ties and for the sake of proper implementation of IHL it is imperative to answer the 
following three key questions:
1. Who is considered a civilian for the purposes of the principle of distinction?
2. What conduct amounts to direct participation in hostilities?
3. What modalities govern the loss of protection against direct attack?
The attempts were made by the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) 
to clarify those issues, which in 2003 initiated the first, informal meeting of IHL 
experts relating to armed conflicts. In sum, five expert meetings were held in The 
Hague and in Geneva between 2003 and 2008.8 Based on the discussions held and 
the research conducted in the course of the expert process, the ICRC drafted its 
“Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
IHL” (hereinafter: “Interpretive Guidance”),9 which provides the ICRC’s recom­
mendations as to how IHL relating to the notion of direct participation in hostili­
ties should be interpreted in light of the circumstances prevailing in contemporary 
armed conflicts. In doing so, the “Interpretive Guidance” does not endeavour to 
change or amend existing rules of IHL, but to ensure their coherent interpretation 
in line with the fundamental principles underlying IHL as a whole.10
1125 UNTS 3 (Additional Protocol I, hereinafter: AP I), and art. 13 (3) of Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 12 December 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (Additional Protocol 
II, hereinafter: AP II).
" Each meeting brought together 40 to 50 legal experts from military, governmental and 
academic circles, as well as from international and non-governmental organizations. The pro­
cess focused on interpreting the notion of direct participation in hostilities for the purposes of 
the conduct of hostilities only and did not (or only very marginally) address the legal regime 
applicable in the event of capture or detention of persons having directly participated in hos­
tilities. N. Melzer, ‘The ICRC’s Clarification Process on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law’, p. 3, at <http://www.oas.org/dil/esp/XXX- 
VI_curso_The_ICRC_Clarification_Process_Nils_Melzer.pdf>, 2 December 2012.
9 This document is available online on the ICRC’s website: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/re- 
sources/documents/publication/p0990.htm>, 2 December 2012.
1,1 N. Melzer, ‘The ICRC’s Clarification...’, p. 3. Although the “Interpretive Guidance” is 
not and cannot be legally binding, in its authors’ opinion, the document’s conclusions and rec­
ommendations may contribute to ensuring that those who do not take a direct part in hostilities 
receive the humanitarian protection they are entitled to under IHL. Ibid., p. 10.
The present article addresses the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
in a manner similar to how the problem was handled in “Interpretive Guidance”. 
Therefore, the following questions have been addressed:
1. What is the definition and status of a civilian in time of armed conflict?
2. What conduct amounts to direct participation in hostilities?
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3. Should there be any restraints on the use of force against civilians taking di­
rect participation in hostilities and thus being exposed as legitimate targets of 
attack?
In brief, the legal nature of the principle of distinction has been discussed and 
the question of temporal loss of protection in case of civilians who are directly 
involved in military operations is being tackled. The analysis of the above issues 
is to a certain extent based on arguments presented in “Interpretive Guidance” 
with the stress being put on those IHL elements that guarantee the respect for the 
right to life even in circumstances of direct participation in hostilities when civil­
ians may become vulnerable to attacks. Furthermore, like in ICRC document, the 
phenomenon of “direct participation in hostilities” has been subjected to analysis 
exclusively from IHL perspective, that is, a set of legal rules which seek, for hu­
manitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflicts. The primary aim of 
international humanitarian law is to protect the victims of armed conflict (per­
sons who are not, or are no longer, participating in hostilities) and to regulate the 
conduct of hostilities (to restrict the means and methods of warfare) based on 
a balance between military necessity and humanity. Admittedly, international law 
of human rights also applies to armed conflicts but the author, inspired by the ap­
proach adopted in “Interpretive Guidance”, has decided to reflect upon principles 
and standards of the above law only indirectly.
Let us underline the fact that the present work focuses only on the issue of 
the respect of civilians’ life in circumstances when they are directly involved in 
hostilities and are bound to lose protection against “direct attack”. It is manda­
tory to remember that during an armed conflict the life of civilians may be ex­
posed to dangers other than resulting from the direct attack - fatalities among 
civilians may be caused by other, even non-military activities conducted by the 
parties to an armed conflict (e.g. individuals condemned to death by the occu­
pational authorities).
The Status of "Civilian" under International Humanitarian Law
The status and protection from which the civilians benefit during an armed 
conflict result from the principle of distinction, which is one of the basic principles 
at the core of IHL. According to Art. 48 of the Additional Protocol I of 1977, “the 
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accord­
ingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives”. Undoubtedly, 
the principle of distinction also constitutes an integral part of customary interna­
tional humanitarian law and is recognized as fundamental and intransgressible. As 
Kenneth Watkin highlights, “distinguishing between combatants and civilians has 
been, historically and culturally, an important aspect of warfare and has long been 
recognized as the indispensable means by which humanitarian principles are in­
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jected into the rules governing conduct in war”.11 Accordingly, the principle of dis­
tinction introduces a clear division into combatants and non-combatants (along 
with military targets and civil objects). IHL identifies no other indirect categories.
11 K. Watkin, ‘Warriors without rights? Combatants, unprivileged belligerents, and the 
struggle over legitimacy’, HPCR Occasional Paper Series, Winter (2005), pp. 8-9. See also: ‘Le­
gality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons’, Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice, 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep 1996, 226, para 434; J.-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, t. 1: Rules, Cambridge 2005, rule 1. According to 
Gary Solis, the principle of distinction is regarded as the “most significant battlefield concept 
a combatant must observe”. G. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict. International Humanitarian 
Law in War, New York 2010, p. 251.
12 It should be noted that State armed forces may consist of combatants and non-combat­
ants, including personnel assigned to exclusively medical, religious, or civil defence functions, 
and that civilians may retain their status although they are integrated, for example, into military 
aircraft crews. Consequently, membership in regular armed forces clearly depends on formal 
rather than functional criteria. See: N. M e 1 z e r, ‘Keeping the balance between military necessity 
and humanity. A rafour critiques of the ICRC’s interpretive guidance on the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42 
(2010), p. 844.
13 Concerning attacks directed against combatants, Yoram Dinstein rightly notices, that 
“[t] here are [...] a number of caveats: (i) the attack must be carried out outside neutral territory, 
(ii) it is not allowed when a ceasefire is in effect, (iii) no prohibited weapons may be used, (iv) 
no perfidious methods of warfare may be resorted to, (v) combatants are not to be attacked once 
they become hors de combat (by choice (surrendered personnel) or because they are wounded, 
sick or shipwrecked), and (vi) the attack must not be expected to cause excessive injury to civil­
ians”. Y. Dinstein, ‘Distinction and loss of civilian protection in international armed conflicts’, 
U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies. International Law and Military Operations 
(ed. by M.D. Carsten), Vol. 84 (2008), p. 184.
14 S.E. Nahlik, ‘Status prawny kombatanta’, Sprawy Międzynarodowe, No. 12(1988),p. 114.
Due to the dichotomous classification introduced by the principle of distinc­
tion, the concept of a civilian provided by IHL is negatively delimited; therefore 
civilians are identified as non-combatants.12 In particular, according to Art. 50 (1) 
of AP I, “[a] civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories 
of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third [Geneva] 
Convention [of 1949] and in Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether 
a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian”.
In general, within the group of combatants falls, in a broad sense, the cat­
egory of members of the armed forces (both regular and irregular) as well as civil­
ian population who took up arms in response to the dangers of invading forces 
(the so called levee en masse). Combatants are authorized to directly participate 
in hostilities and therefore may be considered legitimate targets of attacks (unless 
they surrender or otherwise become hors de combat including due to injuries).13 
Only combatants are entitled to the prisoner of war status and related privileges 
because the aforesaid prisoner of war status is the logical consequence of the com­
batant status.14 Non-combatants (civilians), however, may not directly participate 
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in military operations; moreover, they are entitled to protection against attacks 
according to IHL, which entails that a civilian is every person who is classified as 
non-combatant.
Thus, IHL does not provide a clear and express definition of “a civilian” by de­
termining to whom it refers but rather demonstrates which groups of individuals 
are excluded from the above category. As an advantage of this approach a separa­
ble division is guaranteed according to which an individual is either a combatant 
or a civilian. One and the same individual may not belong to both categories at the 
same time or belong to neither of them.15
15 See: K. Randzio-Sajkowska, M. Sajkowski, ‘Ochrona osób cywilnych w konflik­
tach zbrojnych’ in K. Lan kosz (ed.), Międzynarodowe prawo humanitarne konfliktów zbro­
jnych, Dęblin 2006, p. 98.
16 Civilians who have the status of levée en masse are the inhabitants of a territory which 
has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist 
the invading troops without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units. The 
participants in such levée en masse are expected to carry arms openly and to respect the laws 
and customs of war.
17 K. Dormann, ‘The legal situation of unlawful/unprivileged combatants, International 
Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85 (2003), p. 46, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1560775500103529.
18 See: Art. 51 (3) of AP I. See also: J.-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck, Customary..., 
rule 6.
19 K. Wat ki n, ‘Warriors. p. 11. Nobuo Hayashi describes this status as “[a] conduct-based 
ad hoc liability to being made the object of an attack by combatants of an adverse party using 
lawful means and methods of combat while participating directly in hostilities”. N. Hayashi, 
‘Continuous Attack Liability Without Right or Fact of Direct Participation in Hostilities - the 
ICRC Interpretative Guidance and Perils of Pseudo-Status’ in J. Nowakowska-Mafusecka 
(ed.), Międzynarodowe prawo humanitarne. Antecedencje i wyzwania współczesności. Interna­
tional Humanitarian Law. Antecedences and Challenges of the Present Time, Bydgoszcz-Kato­
wice 2010, p. 60. A contrary view is taken by Yoram Dinstein, who states that “civilians are 
not allowed to participate actively in the fighting: if they do they lose their status as civilians”. 
Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, Cam­
bridge 2004, p. 27.
Except for the relatively rare case of a levee en masse,16 civilians do not have 
the right to participate directly in hostilities.17 Nevertheless, there are many situa­
tions in contemporary armed conflicts where civilians directly participate in hos­
tile operations. In such situations they remain civilians but become lawful targets 
of attacks for as long as they do so. In other words, civilian immunity from attack 
is lost only where the person takes an active and direct part in hostilities.18 The 
above does not entail that taking part in fighting guarantees the combatant status. 
As far as IHL is concerned, an individual may either be a civilian or a combatant 
but never one and the other at the same time. Accordingly, it should be noted that 
civilians taking a direct part in hostilities lose the protection of “civilian” status but 
not the status itself.19
The status of a civilian is therefore clear: he or she is entitled to protection in so 
far as he or she refrains from participation in hostilities. Civilians lose protection 
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against direct attack for the duration of their direct participation in hostilities. In 
addition, such direct or indirect participation in hostilities may constitute the basis 
for facing criminal sanctions if such possibility is admitted by the penal laws of 
a given country. With regard to this aspect “Interpretive Guidance” is comparable 
to conclusions that might be drawn from the Geneva Convention of 1949 and Ad­
ditional Protocols of 1977.20
211 P. Grzebyk,‘Pojęcia...’, p. 64.
21 M. Sassôli, L.M. Olson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian and 
human rights law where it matters: admissible killing and internment of fighters in non-inter- 
national armed conflicts’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 90 (2008), p. 607. Compare: 
L. Doswald-Beck, ‘The right to life in armed conflict. Does international humanitarian law 
provide all the answers?’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 88 (2006), p. 889 (“IHL does 
not formally recognize the status of combatant in non-international conflicts. This is not due to 
any altruistic articulation by governments of the need to avoid using force against all persons 
during such conflicts, but rather because of their insistence that rebels must not in any shape or 
form benefit from any kind of international recognition [... ] On the other hand, it is accepted 
that there cannot be an unlimited use of force by governments during such conflicts”).
22 See: Art. 1 (1) of AP II. Under this provision, to be considered an “organized armed 
group”, a group must have a “responsible command”, exercise control over territory, carry out 
“sustained and concerted military operations” and abide by its obligations under AP II.
23 However, Louise Doswald-Beck states that “even fighting members of such groups 
would be exempt from attack in situations where they presented no threat and could easily be 
arrested, [like in] the hypothetical case of a rebel in the process of doing his shopping in the su­
permarket [...]. One basis for this conclusion was that he would be a person not taking a direct 
part in hostilities at that time”. L. Doswald-Beck, ‘The right to life...’, p. 890.
In case of non-international armed conflict the concept of a “combatant” does 
not exist (along with the related notion of a “prisoner of war”)21 - conflict occurs 
between armed forces of a state and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups.22 The term “civilian” still exists (though not defined) as well as pro­
tection that such persons may enjoy - according to art. 4(1) of AP II, „ [a]ll persons 
who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities [... ] are 
entitled to respect for their person [...]. They shall in all circumstances be treated 
humanely”, and according to art. 13 (2) of AP II, „the civilian population as such, 
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack”, with the reservation 
that such protection ceases with the moment and for the duration of direct par­
ticipation in hostilities. Considering the above, an individual may become a target 
of attack if and to the extent he is a member of an organized armed group or takes 
direct part in hostilities.23 The concept of “direct participation in hostilities” may 
be interpreted in a manner corresponding to the meaning it has been given in the 
context of international conflict whereas doubts may be raised by the membership 
in “organized armed group” since treaty law lacks applicable provisions to deter­
mine such membership.
In the light of “Interpretive Guidance” the notion of “organized armed groups” 
refers to irregular “armed forces” of a state or non-state party to an armed conflict. 
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As such, organized armed groups assume combat function and therefore are in­
volved in the conduct of military operations on behalf of one party to the conflict. 
As opposed to the membership in regular armed forces, membership in organized 
armed groups is more functional rather than official and according to “Interpre­
tive Guidance” depends on those individuals only who assume continuous combat 
function. Like in the case of combatants, members of organized armed groups 
cease to be civilians when they lose protection against direct attack for the dura­
tion of performing combat functions.24
24 See: International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, pp. 27-36, 70.
25 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
26 Ibid., p. 34.
27 Compare: N. Hayashi, ‘Continuous...’, p. 57.
28 See: P. Grzebyk, ‘Poj^cia...’, p. 65.
29 See: M.S. Wong, ‘Targeted killings and the international legal framework With particu­
lar reference to the U.S. operation against Osama bin Laden’, Chinese Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 11 (2012), p. 148, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmr052 .
Exercise of continuous combat function does not imply entitlement to com­
batant privilege. It has been expressly underlined in “Interpretive Guidance” that 
this category rather distinguishes members of the organized fighting forces of 
a non-State party from civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a merely 
spontaneous, sporadic or unorganized basis or assume exclusively political, ad­
ministrative or other non-combat functions (e.g. act as a part of a political wing of 
a given fighting organization).25 Continuous combat function requires lasting in­
tegration into an organized armed group acting as the armed forces of a non-State 
party to an armed conflict. Thus, individuals whose continuous function involves 
preparation, execution or command of operations amounting to direct participa­
tion in hostilities are considered to assume a continuous combat function.26
In conclusion, exercise of “continuous combat function” within an armed 
group creates a status as a result of which an individual may become a target of 
attack at any time, even when such an individual is not directly involved in any 
hostilities at that time.27 An individual ceases to be a legitimate target of attacks 
only when he permanently disengages from combat functions - the problem is, 
however, that it is hard to determine how much time should elapse from laying 
down arms in order for that individual to be qualified as a civilian.28
In contemporary armed conflicts it is not easy to distinguish members of or­
ganized armed groups from civilians, regardless their combat functions which are 
not an easy subject of identification, either.29 Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that 
in the co-called asymmetric warfare, due to a significant disparity in power of one 
party to a conflict, the opposing party - in an attempt to attain their goals - often 
resorts to violation of IHL, in particular fails to abide by the principle of distinc­
tion and ignores measures that might be helpful in distinguishing themselves from 
civilians, and further, members of such fighting forces intentionally impersonate 
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civilians and abuse the enemy’s good faith.30 Such behaviour of a weaker actor of 
an asymmetric conflict may be of significant military value since varying openly 
from civilian population and withdrawing from the method of hiding from the 
enemy might lead to a defeat. The described conduct, however, is a flagrant breach 
of IHL rules. It must also be noted that the above tactics may lead to weakening of 
protection of civilian population since the stronger party to a conflict that observes 
the international law, faces an extremely difficult task of effective distinguishing 
combatants/fighting groups of an enemy from civilians.31
w Compare: T.A. Keck, ‘Not All Civilians...’, p. 3.
” As rightly noted by Eric Talbot Jensen, the increasing number of victims among civil­
ian population in contemporary conflicts surely results from the lack of possibility to reliably 
distinguish who, according to the law, may be a legitimate target of attack and who is protected 
against such attack. E. Talbot Jensen, ‘The ICJ’s Uganda Wall. A barrier to the principle of 
distinction and an entry point for lawfare’, Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol. 35 
(2008), p. 243.
32 Y. Dinstein,‘Distinction...’, p. 190.
33 Ibid.
The specific IHL provisions call for the above problem to be justly solved. Un­
der Art. 50 (1) of AP I, “[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that 
person shall be considered to be a civilian”. As Yoram Dinstein highlights, “[this] 
provision is particularly germane to the issue of direct participation in hostilities. 
It is imperative to ensure that military units tasked with the mission of winnow­
ing out civilians who engage in hostilities will not treat all civilians as targetable”.32 
Additionally, Art. 50 (3) of AP I stipulates that “[t]he presence within the civilian 
population of individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does 
not deprive the population of its civilian character”. Thus, “the presence of civilians 
directly participating in hostilities among the civilian population does not deprive 
the population at large of the protection from attack that it is entitled to”.33
The application of the above-mentioned rules might be problematic on the 
contemporary battlefield. In circumstances of an asymmetric conflict life and 
safety of combatants more and more depends on how quickly and effectively an 
adversary blended in the civilian population is recognized. However, it happens 
very seldom, indeed that an individual in question is successfully identified as 
non-civilian, which may lead to a situation when combatants, under the appli­
cable law, should treat a potential adversary as a civilian. The above might cause 
specific problems when a suicide assassination is involved, the efficacy of which 
greatly depends on an act of perfidy or betrayal of trust (pretending a civilian by 
an assassinator and blending in the crowd of civilian population). What aggravates 
the situation is that doubts concerning the status of an assassinator are usually 
resolved only when an assassination had already been carried out when any pre­
ventive actions are beyond reach. A party to the conflict which duly observes IHL 
provisions has therefore a limited scope of effective methods of defence against an 
adversary applying such tactics. Despite the above-mentioned inconvenience, it 
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should be underlined that “protecting civilians from violence is an important cor­
nerstone of a successful counterinsurgency campaign”,34 therefore in the foregoing 
case it is extremely important to rely on intelligence and preventive measures even 
when it would mean having the armed forces involved in activities typical for law 
enforcement agencies.35
34 T.A. Keck, ‘Not All Civilians...’, p. 138.
35 For example, as noted by Rupert Smith, the reason for engagement of the British Army 
in Northern Ireland was to support the police forces (such operation was referred to as military 
support given to civil authorities). The army, therefore, performed an auxiliary function to­
wards civil authorities. R. Smith, Przydatność sity militarnej. Sztuka wojenna we współczesnym 
świecie. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, transl. by A. i J. Maziarscy, 
Warszawa 2010, pp. 13-14, 324.
36 N. Melzer,‘Keeping...’, p. 857.
37 Commentary on the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Article 51,
para 1944, at <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/470-750065?OpenDocument>, 9 September 
2012 (hereinafter: Commentary on the АР I).
While planning a military operation all necessary precautions should be taken 
to avoid unjustified suffering. Therefore, while deciding upon planning and at­
tacking a specified target, not only operational capability must be taken into con­
sideration but also binding rules governing the use of force along with IHL regula­
tions and standards. In the light of those regulations, all precautions must be taken 
to verify ex ante that the targeted object is a legitimate military target and even if 
it is positively ascertained, the kind and degree of permissible force must be pro­
portionate to danger in order to avoid or minimize incidental losses or harms that 
might be inflicted on civilians or to the civil property. Once it becomes apparent 
that losses and harms would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated, those responsible must refrain from launching the 
attack, or suspend or cancel it, if applicable.
As regards civilians, in practice, all feasible precautions must be taken in de­
termining whether the targeted person is a civilian and, if so, whether he directly 
participates in hostilities. In case of doubt as to whether a person is a civilian, he 
must presumed to be a civilian; and in case of doubt as to whether a civilian is di­
rectly participating in hostilities, it must be presumed that he is not and, therefore, 
that he remains protected against direct attack.36
Actions Which Constitute Direct Participation in Hostilities
Under Commentary on the Additional Protocol I of 1977, the notion of “direct 
participation in hostilities” refers to “acts of war which by their nature or purpose 
are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed 
forces”.37 *According to the ICRC’s “Interpretive Guidance”, acts falling within the 
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scope of direct participation in hostilities (DPH) must meet three cumulative cri­
teria, namely:
1. the threshold of harm;
2. direct causation;
3. the belligerent nexus.
Basically, the above criteria demonstrate balanced proportions between the 
military necessity and humanitarian reasons - rules of fundamental importance 
from both treaty and customary international humanitarian law’s point of view. 
In practice, those criteria represent rational guidelines for states trying to solve 
a question whether a certain act qualifies as direct participation in hostilities.
Ad. 1) In order for an activity to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, 
the harm likely to result from it must attain a certain threshold. This threshold can 
be reached either by causing harm of a specifically military nature or by inflicting 
death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack.38 
It should be noted that “the qualification of an act as direct participation does not 
require the materialization of harm [...] but merely the objective likelihood that 
the act will result in such harm”.39 Killing or wounding military personnel as well as 
acts resulting in damage to military objects would obviously qualify. The threshold 
of harm requirement could also be reached by acts, which may not immediately 
result in concrete losses, but adversely affect “the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to the conflict”, including sabotage and other armed or unarmed 
activities restricting or disturbing deployments, logistics and communications.40
International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 47.
” Ibid.
40 T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians...’, p. 142.
41 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, pp. 49-50.
42 N. Melzer,‘Keeping...’, p. 861.
43 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 50.
In the absence of military harm, civilian activities can still amount to direct 
participation in hostilities if they are likely to inflict death, injury, or destruction.41 
In most cases, this “alternative threshold of harm” would become relevant
where a party to the conflict directs its attacks not against legitimate military targets 
but, for example, specifically against the civilian population or civilian objects. While 
such attacks would invariably amount to grave violations of IHL or even war crimes, 
the relevant criterion for their qualification as direct participation in hostilities is not 
that they are unlawful or criminal, but that they constitute an integral part of armed 
confrontations occurring between belligerents.42
Thus, if civilian conduct is not likely to result in military harm (although it 
may adversely affect public security or health, like the building of road blocks or 
the interruption of water and food supplies), it is not part of the hostilities and can­
not be qualified as direct participation in hostilities.43
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To sum up, in order for civilians to lose their protection against attack, they 
must either harm the enemy’s military operations or capacity, or they must use 
means and methods of warfare directly against protected persons or objects.44
44 N. Melzer,‘Keeping...’, p. 862.
45 Ibid., p. 863.
46 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 51.
47 Ibid., p. 52.
4" T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians...’, pp. 128-129.
49 Compare: M.N. Schmitt, ‘The interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participa­
tion in hostilities. A critical analysis’, Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 1 (2010), pp. 30- 
-31; R. Borrmann, ‘IKRK-Leitfaden unter Beschuss. Aktueller Stand der Diskussion um die 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that
immunity from direct attack does not preclude the permissibility of the use of force, 
even on a significant scale, if necessary to prevent the commission of grave crimes. 
It merely entails that the force used against perpetrators not qualifying as legitimate 
military targets remains governed by the standards of law enforcement and individu­
al self-defence and not by those of the conduct of hostilities.45
Ad. 2) According to the ICRC, there must also be “a direct casual link between 
a specific act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated 
military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part”.46 Moreover, “[f]or 
a specific act to qualify as direct rather than indirect participation in hostilities there 
must be a sufficiently close casual relation between the act and the resulting harm”.47 
Thus, “mere participation in the war effort does not rise to the level of direct partici­
pation; the individual’s actions must be directly linked to the conduct of hostilities”.48
It must, therefore, be determined how direct participation in military opera­
tions differs from indirect participation, or, in a broader sense, in an armed con­
flict. According to ICRC the difference is between participation in hostilities and 
participation in war efforts, which, in a way, is conclusive since only the first of the 
above cited cases entails temporal suspension of immunity of a civilian.
In the event of conventional warfare conducted between states, fixing a strict 
boundary between “direct participation in hostilities” and “war efforts” does not 
seem to pose much of a challenge. Actions of the opponent’s army are focused on 
destroying the adversary’s military force in open confrontation; otherwise losses 
of the opponent will be none. Whereas contribution to war effort could be said to 
include all activities aiming at increase of military power of a party to the conflict 
to which a civilian belongs. Such contribution does not directly entail inflicting 
losses to an opponent. For example, production of hand grenades (or Molotov’s 
cocktails) shall obviously bring increase of military power of a party to the conflict, 
but as such shall not cause any loss to an enemy - therefore may be classified as 
contribution to the general war effort. Whereas the use of the foregoing weapons 
during fights with an opposing party shall result in direct probability of harms and 
losses which qualifies this act as hostility.49
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In ICRC opinion there must be a sufficiently close causal relation between 
a specific act and a resulting harm. In addition, it must be expressly stated that 
a given act is capable of bringing about harm “at one causal step” and the distinc­
tion between direct and indirect participation in hostilities must be interpreted as 
corresponding to that between direct and indirect causation of harm.50 Therefore, 
an individual conduct that merely builds up or maintains the capacity of a party 
to harm its adversary (e.g. by recruitment and training of militants, providing 
ideological or financial support) or which otherwise only indirectly causes harm 
(e.g. purchase or smuggling of weapons used in fights) should be excluded from 
the concept of “direct participation in hostilities”.51 Such approach as demonstrated 
above leads to rather narrow understanding of “direct participation in hostilities”, 
in particular to a conclusion that direct participation refers only to the conduct of 
military operations and an individual who directly participates in hostilities re­
mains a legitimate target of attacks for only as long as he or she is actually involved 
in participation.
Auslegung des Begriffs der direkten Teilnahme an der Kampfhandlungen in Μ. Kun - Buczko, 
Μ. Przybysz (eds.), Bezpieczeństwo w dobie globalizacji. Prawo i praktyka, Białystok 2011, 
pp. 239-240.
50 See: International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, pp. 52-53.
51 Ibid., p. 53.
52 Ibid., p. 58.
53 Ibid., p. 59.
54 Ibid.
55 T.A. Keck, ‘Not All Civilians...’, p. 143.
Ad. 3) According to the “Interpretive Guidance”, “in order to amount to direct 
participation in hostilities, civilian conduct must not only be objectively likely to 
directly cause the required threshold of harm, but must also be specifically designed 
to do so in support of a party to an armed conflict and to the detriment of another 
(belligerent nexus)”.52 Consequently, “[a]rmed violence which is not designed to 
harm a party to an armed conflict, or which is not designed· to do so in support 
of another party, cannot amount to any form of participation in hostilities taking 
place between these parties”.53
Importantly, the belligerent nexus should be distinguished from concepts such 
as subjective intent and hostile intent - these relate to the state of mind of the per­
son concerned, whereas belligerent nexus relates to the objective purpose of the 
act.54 As Trevor Keck rightly notes, “[tjhe reasons for participation in an act do not 
matter unless the individual is unaware of his or her participation. For instance, 
a driver unaware that he is transporting a bomb would remain protected. Any di­
rect attack would need to take his death into proportionality considerations. Thus, 
while the reasons for the individual’s participation in hostilities do not matter, the 
persons knowledge of participation does”.55
The belligerent nexus is significant in order to distinguish an individual’s par­
ticipation in the conduct of war from criminal activities or acts of self-defence 
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against “marauding soldiers”.56 For example, the stealing of military equipment for 
private use may cause the required threshold of harm, but is not specifically de­
signed to support a party to the conflict by harming another.57 Similarly, taking ad­
vantage of a breakdown of law and order to commit violent crimes would not meet 
the “belligerent nexus” requirement. Furthermore, civilians defending themselves 
against unlawful attack or looting by the parties to a conflict do not participate in 
hostilities by virtue of using force to defend themselves.58 It is also important to 
distinguish direct participation in hostilities from violent forms of civil unrest, the 
primary purpose of which is to express dissatisfaction with the territorial or de­
taining authorities.59 As regards the use of force by civilians against other civilians, 
to become part of the conduct of hostilities, the use of force must be specifically 
designed to support a party to an armed conflict in its military confrontation with 
another. For example, such direct attacks on civilians may meet the “belligerent 
nexus” requirement, provided the use of force is motivated by the same political 
disputes or ethnic hatred that underlie the surrounding armed conflict and where 
it causes harm of a specific military nature.60
56 Ibid.
57 International Committee of the Red Cross, 'Interpretive Guidance...’, pp. 60-61.
58 See: T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians...’, p. 143.
59 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 63.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
Additionally, the ICRC highlights basic distinction between the conduct of 
hostilities and the exercise of power or authority over persons or territory. Con­
sequently, the infliction of death, injury, or destruction by civilians on persons 
or objects in their power - within the meaning of IHL - does not, without more, 
constitute part of the hostilities. Moreover, even the perpetration of war crimes or 
other violations of IHL outside the conduct of hostilities is excluded from the con­
cept of DPH. Thus, while collective punishment, hostage-taking, and summary 
execution of persons in physical custody are undoubtedly prohibited by IHL, they 
are not part of the conduct of hostilities.61
Temporary Dimension of Direct Participation in Hostilities
One of the most controversial issues regarding direct participation in hostili­
ties is how to reasonably determine the time limits of such participation during 
which a civilian loses protection and may become a legitimate target of attack. Ac­
cording to Art. 51 (3) of AP I, civilians enjoy a general protection against dangers 
arising from military operations „unless and for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities”. Therefore, in each case of participation in hostilities it is abso­
lutely vital to determine when such participation starts and when it ends.
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According to the ICRC, the concept of DPH undoubtedly includes the imme­
diate execution phase of a specific act meeting the three requirements of thresh­
old of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus, but it also includes measures 
preparatory to the execution of such an act, as well as the deployment to and re­
turn from the location of its execution, when they constitute an integral part of 
such a specific act or operation.62 In other words, deployments and preparatory 
measures do not become independent acts of direct participation that can ad in­
finitum be preceded by further deployments and preparatory measures, but they 
are regarded as an integral part of an act or operation, which qualifies as direct 
participation in hostilities because it meets the three above-mentioned criteria.63 
For example, the loading of bombs onto an airplane in preparation for an attack 
on military targets constitutes a preparatory measure for a specific hostile act and, 
therefore, qualifies as DPH. Similarly, the delivery by a civilian truck driver of am­
munition to an active firing position at the front line, equipment, instruction and 
transport of combatants, or gathering of intelligence - if carried out with a view 
to the execution of a specific hostile act - would have to be regarded as an integral 
part of ongoing combat operations and, consequently, as DPH. Conversely, mere 
transportation of weapons from a factory to a storage place for later use, general 
recruitment and training of personnel, and financial or political support to armed 
actors would constitute general preparatory measures qualifying as mere indirect 
participation.64
62 Ibid., p. 65.
63 N. Melzer,‘Keeping...’, p. 883.
64 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, pp. 56-67.
65 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
“ Commentary on the AP I, para 1944.
67 N. Melzer, ‘Keeping...’, pp. 883-884.
As regards the cases of deployment and return, if the execution of a specific 
act of DPH requires prior geographic deployment, such deployment already con­
stitutes an integral part of the act in question. Likewise, as long as the return from 
the execution of a hostile act remains an integral part of the preceding operation, 
it constitutes a military withdrawal and should not be confused with surrender or 
otherwise becoming hors de combat. Thus, both the deployment and return should 
be carried out as an integral part of a specific act amounting to direct participation 
in hostilities. Importantly, that determination must be made with utmost care and 
based on a reasonable evaluation of the prevailing circumstances.65
The ICRC also explains the temporary and continuous loss of protection, not­
ing that “[ojnce he ceases to participate, the civilian regains his right to protection 
[...] and he may no longer be attacked”.66 Thus, “civilians lose and regain protec­
tion against direct attack in parallel with the intervals of their engagement in di­
rect participation in hostilities”.67 This phenomenon is referred to as the “revolving 
door” theory and is strongly contested, as it enables insurgents to exploit the law 
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to the detriment of law-abiding parties.68 However, in Nils Melzers opinion, this 
theory “is [...] necessary for the protection of the civilian population from errone­
ous or arbitrary attack”69 - its aim is to prevent attacks on civilians who do not, at 
the time, represent a military threat.70
68 See: T.A. Keck,‘Not all civilians...’, pp. 149-150.
69 N. Melzer,‘Keeping...’, p. 891.
7,1 See: International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 70. Com­
pare: T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians...’, p. 151.
71 Y. Dinstein, ‘Distinction...’, p. 190.
72 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 71.
73 Y. Dinstein, ‘Distinction...’, p. 190.
74 P. Grzebyk, ‘Poj^cia...’, p. 71. Compare: Commentary on the AP I, Article 51 (3), para 
1944 (“Once he ceases to participate, the civilian [...] may no longer be attacked [...] there is 
On the other hand, “if an individual becomes a member of an organized armed 
group (which collectively takes a direct part in hostilities), he would lose civilian 
protection for as long as that membership lasts”.71 In other words, they lose pro­
tection against direct attack for as long as they assume their continuous combat 
function.72 Membership in an organized armed group begins in the moment when 
a civilian starts de facto to assume a continuous combat function for the group, 
and lasts until he or she ceases to assume such function. Therefore, the “revolving 
door” concept starts to operate based on that membership. Such attitude seems 
to be sensible taking into consideration the principle of equality of parties to an 
armed conflict. If, in case of members of organized armed groups, loss of protec­
tion would be limited only to the duration of direct participation in hostilities, it 
would provide members of such groups with a significant operational advantage 
over members of State armed forces (who may fall a target of attack throughout 
the whole duration of a conflict) thus causing an imbalance which is necessary to 
be maintained under IHL provisions. Such imbalance would, in turn, encourage 
members of organized armed groups to operate as “weekend fighters” or “farmers 
by day, fighters by night”. Therefore, in practical terms, members of an organized 
armed group may be targeted, even when not personally linked to any specific 
hostile act - simply due to their membership in such a group, and as long as that 
membership continues.73
To sum up, a civilian who ceases to directly participate in hostilities and a mem­
ber of organized armed groups of a non-State party who withdraws from continu­
ous combat function, regain full protection against direct attacks. This does not 
imply, however, that such individuals cannot face criminal sanctions for violation 
of domestic and international laws. Comments to “Interpretive Guidance” stress 
that direct participation in hostilities is neither prohibited by international hu­
manitarian law nor criminalized under the statutes of international criminal tribu­
nals but an individual who directly or indirectly participates in hostilities may be 
prosecuted for violation of domestic laws such as treason, homicide or destruction 
of property.74
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Restraints on the Use of Force Against Civilians
Directly Participating in Hostilities
In 1975 Professor Jean Pictet wrote: “If we can put a soldier out of action by cap­
turing him, we should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding 
him, we must not kill him. If there are two means to achieve the same military ad­
vantage, we must choose the one which causes the lesser evil”.75 The above obviously 
is not to be understood as imposing an obligation, during a military operation, on 
members of armed forces to proceed in a manner corresponding to that of law en­
forcement agencies for which the use of lethal force should be last resort. It should 
be noted that
nothing to prevent the authorities capturing him in the act or arresting him at a later stage”).
75 J.S. Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims, Leiden 1975, pp. 75-76.
76 M. Sassoli, L.M. Olson, ‘The relationship...’, p. 606.
77 See: Art. 22 of GC IV and Art. 35 (1) of AP I.
7S International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 78.
79 See: Art. 2 of AP I and the preamble of AP II.
combatants are part of the military potential of the enemy and it is therefore always 
lawful to attack them for the purpose of weakening that potential. The traditional 
understanding is that no rule restricts the use of force against combatants only to 
those circumstances in which they cannot be captured. Within humanitarian law this 
view has been challenged, citing both the principle of military necessity as a restric­
tion on all violence and the prohibition of treacherous killings.76
The ICRC expressly supports a notion of “humanitarisation” of warfare un­
derlying that „the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited”.77 In truth, in order to forbid infliction of unnecessary suffering a num­
ber of international conventions have been adopted prohibiting the use of means 
and weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering 
and to conduct warfare in a way which denies the fundamental humanitarian 
rules. Despite, however, numerous standards which govern the use of prohibited 
means and methods of warfare, the specific provisions of treaty law do not ex­
pressly regulate the kind and degree of force permissible against legitimate targets. 
In the absence of the above express regulations, the ICRC suggests that the use of 
force in an armed conflict be determined by the principles of military necessity 
and humanity, which „underlie and inform the normative framework of IHL, and 
therefore shape the context in which its rules must be interpreted”.78
With reference to the principle of humanity, the so-called Martens Clause, in­
corporated in both Additional Protocols of 1977,79 must be noted. The contents of 
the Clause remain a part of a customary IHL. In the light of the aforesaid clause, 
which reflects the principle of humanity, “[i]n cases not covered by this Protocol or 
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by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the pro­
tection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”.
The principle of military necessity which is one of the key principles of IHL, 
permits only the use of such measures and force and to such degree, which are not 
forbidden by the laws of war, that are required to bring about the successful con­
clusion of a military operation, i.e. partial or complete submission of the enemy in 
the shortest possible time and with the minimum power exerted (which also refers 
to sparing the lives of own soldiers). What indirectly follows from this principle 
is an obligation to take into account the humanitarian considerations which for­
bid superfluous injuries or unnecessary suffering in order to accomplish justified 
military purposes.80 Therefore, in the context of direct participation in hostilities, 
the principle of military necessity as well as humanitarian considerations should 
underlie determination of permissible kind and degree of force to be used in justi­
fied military circumstances.81
811 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 79.
81 N. Melzer, ‘Keeping...’, p. 904. For the sake of clarification, the loss of protection against 
attacks within the meaning of IHL is not to be deemed as a sanction for criminal activities but 
a consequence of the military necessity in the conduct of hostilities.
82 T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians...’, p. 154.
83 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Interpretive Guidance...’, p. 78.
8,1 Ibid., p. 80.
Taking into account the foregoing remarks and conclusions, ICRC underlines 
that the use of lethal force in the circumstances of warfare must be based on a bal­
ance between military necessity and the principle of humanity. Obviously, the 
considerations of humanity and military necessity must not override the specific 
provisions of IHL but should rather constitute guiding principles to be referred to 
by military advocates, commanders and soldiers whenever legal regulations are 
unclear or imprecise. In other words, in instances where IHL lacks precision or is 
not fully formulated, interpretation must consider the need to maintain balance 
between the principles of military necessity and humanity.82
Proper interpretation of the above-mentioned balance, at the time when war­
fare is in progress, neither grants combatants an unlimited licence to kill nor impos­
es “a legal obligation to capture rather than kill regardless of the circumstances”.83 
Decision as to whether a person being a military target ought to be captured or 
killed must be based on given circumstances, or measures which are reasonable in 
the prevailing circumstances. The level of restrictions as regards the use of lethal 
force may increase with the ability of a party to the conflict to control the area 
and implement the means of stabilisation. As the ICRC highlights, the restraining 
function “may become decisive where armed forces operate against selected indi­
viduals in situations comparable to peacetime policing”,84 and such circumstances 
are likely to occur when a party to the conflict occupies the adversary’s territory or 
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in case of an asymmetric conflict, conducting warfare against non-State actors on 
a territory of a given State.85
85 As Trevor Keck explains, “restraints on the use of force are not hard and fast, but rather 
change based on the circumstances - namely the intensity of the conflict, the parties’ ability to 
project power and ultimately, what is reasonable in a given situation”. T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civil­
ians...’, p. 155.
88 The Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel, Israeli Su­
preme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice, Judgment of 11 December 2005, at chttp:// 
elyonl.court.gov.il/Files_ENG/02/690/007/A34/02007690.A34.pdf>, 2 December 2012.
87 Ibid., para 40.
88 See: T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians...’, pp. 124,139.
89 U.S. Dep’t of Army/Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 sec. 7-36 
(15 December 2006), at <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>, 2 December 2012.
ICRC attitude towards restrictions on the use of force against civilians directly 
participating in hostilities seems to be gradually shared by states as epitomised by 
their practice in the issue in question. At this point it might be worth quoting an 
excerpt from the Israeli Supreme Courts famous verdict in the so-called Targeted 
Killings,86 when the Court was to examine whether the policy of targeted killings 
as conducted by the Israeli government against suspected terrorists (recognised by 
the court as civilians) complied with the law. The Supreme Courts findings in the 
foregoing matter were as follows:
a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked at such time as he is 
doing so, if a less harmful means can be employed [...]. Thus, if a terrorist taking 
a direct part in hostilities can be arrested, interrogated and tried, those are the means 
which should be employed [...]. A rule-of-law state employs, to the extent possible, 
procedures of law and not procedures of force [...]. Arrest, investigation and trial are 
not means which can always be used [...]. However, it is a possibility which should 
always be considered. It might actually be particularly practical under the condi­
tions of belligerent occupation, in which the army controls the area in which the op­
eration takes place, and in which arrest, investigation and trial are at times realisable 
possibilities.87
In general, the need to minimise victims among civilians and to impose lim­
its on the use of lethal force is also addressed by the new U.S. counterinsurgency 
(COIN) doctrine. The U.S. military rewrote its doctrine to respond to the changed 
military and political realities inherent in counterinsurgency warfare. This docu­
ment requires that U.S. forces use less force as a means to prevent civilian casual­
ties, and places greater emphasis on the provision of governance, social services 
and capacity building.88 Interestingly, the COIN doctrine applicable in U.S. coun­
terinsurgency operations imposes far greater restrictions on the use of force than 
in conventional warfare. According to U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual, “[i]n sit­
uations where civil security exists, even tenuously, Soldiers and Marines should 
pursue nonlethal means first, using lethal force only when necessary”.89 It should 
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be noted, however, that the U.S. COIN manual is not a legal document. Rather, it 
provides guidelines and principles for counterinsurgency operations. Neverthe­
less, as Trevor Keck pointed out, “the implementation of the COIN doctrine [in 
Afghanistan] had resulted in significantly narrowing the U.S. rules of engagement 
(ROE), imposing far tighter restrictions on the use of force”.90 The currently ap­
plicable rules of engagement (ROE) put an obligation on the American armed 
forces operating in Afghanistan to apply “capture rather than kill” tactics whenever 
circumstances allow. Even if in possession of reliable and verified information as 
to the current hiding place of a member of Taliban forces, who has been identified 
as a legitimate target of attack, the U.S. military should rather try and capture such 
belligerent, unless he is likely to pose a grave threat to life and security of American 
soldiers.91
9(1 T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians...’, p. 175.
91 Ibid. However, Trevor Keck clearly states that “[¡Increased restrictions on the use of 
force stemming from the COIN doctrine are likely driven by policy”, and not necessarily by IHL 
or IHRL norms. Ibid., p. 176.
92 See: R. Goodman, D. Jinks, ‘The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Fo­
rum’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol. 42 (2010), p. 637.
Conclusions
There is no doubt that the concept of direct participation in hostilities remains 
highly controversial in contemporary armed conflicts. Owing to the employment 
in warfare of new technological developments, there are increased possibilities 
to use lethal force without entering the battlefield which implies that such force 
does not necessarily require to be activated by a human operator. What is more, 
in a warfare theatre there is a growing trend among states towards outsourcing 
of traditional military functions to Private Military and Security Companies in 
order to enhance the chances for a military success. The most significant chal­
lenge, however, arises from the participation of non-State armed groups in con­
temporary armed conflicts who show no respect for the principle of distinction 
- members of such groups fail to distinguish themselves from the civilian popula­
tion by wearing uniforms or their insignia and deliberately intermingle with ci­
vilians or use them as human shields counting on a physical barrier which shall 
prevent an adversary from shooting them. In the light of the foregoing facts, the 
detailed explanation of the notion of direct participation in hostilities and its 
adequate implementation remains a significant dilemma.92 Therefore, ICRC ef­
forts focused on elaboration of detailed guidelines serving interpretation of the 
notion of direct participation in hostilities, crowned with the adoption of “In­
terpretive Guidance” must be seen as useful both for military and civil environ- 
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ment, involved in humanitarian aid, maintaining or restoring peace and global 
security.93
” As Nils Melzer highlights, “the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance cannot, and does not pur­
port to, replace the issuing of contextualized rules of engagement or the judgment of the op­
erational commander. Instead, it aims to facilitate the task of those responsible for the planning 
and conduct of operations by providing useful and coherent concepts and principles based on 
which the required distinctions and determinations ought to be made”. N. Melzer, ‘Keeping...’, 
p. 856.
44 K. Watkin,‘Warriors...’, p. 9.
45 Compare: T.A. Keck, ‘Not all civilians...’, p. 140.
It should be underlined that “traditional dual privileged status approach of 
dividing a population into combatants and civilians is only as effective as the accu­
racy with which the definition of combatant is established and to the extent there 
is a clear understanding of when civilians lose the protection of their status by 
participating in hostilities”.94 Therefore, one of the core assumptions of “Interpre­
tive Guidance” defines that only those civilians who exercise “continuous combat 
function” within an organized armed group or who are continuously involved in 
direct participation in hostilities may legally be identified as a legitimate target of 
attack - presuming, in case of doubt, entitlement to protection. Furthermore, indi­
viduals directly participating in hostilities only sporadically are civilians, protected 
unless engaged in hostilities. In order to determine whether a specific act may be 
qualified as “direct participation in hostilities”, States should apply ICRC criteria 
that comply with both treaty and customary IHL. To lose legal protection, a civil­
ian must perform an act meeting three criteria: 1) threshold of harm; 2) direct 
causation; and 3) the belligerent nexus. All the cumulative criteria must be met in 
order for an individual to lose a status of a person protected against direct attack.
Numerous ambiguities that occur in practice as regards the principle of dis­
tinction, as well as the need to enhance protection of civilians and to prevent 
arbitrary killings, cause us to accept the foregoing restrictive criteria. It is worth 
remembering that targeting individuals who assume political or other functions 
unrelated to hostilities within an armed group, thus deserve to be recognized as 
non-combatants, may be regarded as a violation of IHL, expose armed forces to 
severe criticism and discredit the military operation.95
International humanitarian law provides the fighting parties with basic rules 
and regulations that allow to effectively accomplish military objectives on the one 
hand and to avoid superfluous suffering and unnecessary victims both among 
combatants and non-combatants on the other hand. Therefore, it is of utmost 
importance to maintain balance between the principle of humane treatment and 
demands of military necessity. In the event of effective territorial control, armed 
forces should try to ensure security by applying non-lethal means in the first place. 
Indeed, it would be a gross violation of the rules of law to resort to the use of le­
thal force in circumstances when arrest or capture is sufficient and more rational 
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alternative.96 In the conduct of military operation, in particular in case of counter­
insurgency measures, States should focus on more cautious use of force making 
their best to balance the fundamental IHL rules - the principle of humanity and of 
military necessity which, after all, are not mutually exclusive and may successfully 
be implemented on the contemporary battlefield.
96 Ibid., p. 178.
Abstract
During an armed conflict there may be a situation when a civilian becomes actively 
involved in hostilities, and since this is in contradiction with the international humanitar­
ian law of armed conflict. By doing so, such person risks being deprived of protection they 
otherwise deserve and may become the target of enemy assault. Here, however, appears 
a problem: since the international humanitarian law does not provide a precise definition 
of “direct participation in hostilities” and fails to specify what activities may be described as 
connected with or forming its part. An attempt was made by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross to provide the above definition in Interpretive Guidance on the Notion 
of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (published 
in 2009). Despite numerous critics, the foregoing document should be considered as es­
sential and necessary especially at the time of the “war against terrorism” or in the case of 
the so-called asymmetric conflicts. By defining three obligatory prerequisites that must be 
met in order for an event to qualify as “direct participation in hostilities”, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross more clearly specified the case of “direct participation in 
hostilities”, putting an end to free choice of interpretation that may cause death of innocent 
or neutral persons not involved in warfare actions. Accurate interpretation of the above­
referred notion - which is the core topic of the present article - may contribute to more 
effective protection of civilians against direct attacks and help enforce respect for their life 
during an armed conflict.
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